Amid outrage over civilian deaths in Pakistan, CIA turns to smaller missiles
By Joby Warrick and Peter Finn
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, April 26, 2010; A08
The CIA is using new, smaller missiles and advanced surveillance techniques to minimize civilian casualties in its targeted killings of suspected insurgents in Pakistan's tribal areas, according to current and former officials in the United States and Pakistan.
The technological improvements have resulted in more accurate operations that have provoked relatively little public outrage, the officials said. Pakistan's government has tolerated the airstrikes, which have killed hundreds of suspected insurgents since early 2009, but that support has always been fragile and could quickly evaporate, U.S. and Pakistani officials said.
The CIA declines to publicly discuss its clandestine operations in Pakistan, and a spokesman would not comment on the kinds of weapons the agency is using. But two counterterrorism officials said in interviews that evolving technology and tactics have kept the number of civilian deaths extremely low. The officials, along with other U.S. and Pakistani officials interviewed for this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity because the drone campaign is both classified and controversial.
Last month, a small CIA missile, probably no bigger than a violin case and weighing about 35 pounds, tore through the second floor of a house in Miram Shah, a town in the tribal province of South Waziristan. The projectile exploded, killing a top al-Qaeda official and about nine other suspected terrorists.
The mud-brick house collapsed and the roof of a neighboring house was damaged, but no one else in the town of 5,000 was hurt, according to U.S. officials who have reviewed after-action reports.
Urban strikes
The agency, using 100-pound Hellfire missiles fired from remotely controlled Predator aircraft, once targeted militants largely in rural settings, but lighter weapons and miniature spy drones have made killings in urban areas more feasible, officials said.
According to an internal CIA accounting described to The Washington Post, just over 20 civilians are known to have died in missile strikes since January 2009, in a 15-month period that witnessed more than 70 drone attacks that killed 400 suspected terrorists and insurgents. Agency officials said the CIA's figures are based on close surveillance of targeted sites both before and after the missiles hit.
Unofficial tallies based on local news reports are much higher. The New America Foundation puts the civilian death toll at 181 and reports a far higher number of alleged terrorists and insurgents killed -- more than 690.
The drone strikes have been controversial in Pakistan, where many view them as an infringement on national sovereignty. In the past the strikes have spawned protests, as well as angry denunciations in newspaper editorials and in speeches by opposition politicians.
The clamor over the strikes has died down considerably over the past year, however, and Pakistani officials acknowledge that improved accuracy is one of the reasons. Pakistani security officials say that better targeting technology, a deeper pool of spies in the tribal areas, and greater cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence services have all led to strikes that cause fewer civilian deaths.
Still, the drone strikes are often cited by Pakistanis as a prime reason for their displeasure with U.S. policy in the region. Pakistan has repeatedly asked for its own armed drones so that it can carry out the strikes -- a move that could help the government with the perception that it has ceded authority to the United States. The United States has agreed to provide Pakistan with surveillance drones but has declined to arm them.
Peter Bergen, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, said the agency's accounting of the effects of the drone campaign can neither be confirmed nor refuted without greater access to the tribal areas for outsiders or independent scrutiny of CIA video of the strikes.
Driving perceptions
Officials say CIA targeteers are increasingly driven to avoid civilian deaths, in part to tamp down any political blowback from Pakistan and from U.S. and international human rights groups. Current and former officials point to the relative absence of complaints from local and regional leaders as evidence of the success of their efforts.
"Where are the photos of atrocities? Where are the protests?" asked one U.S. official who closely monitors the program. "After civilian deaths in Afghanistan, there are always press reports. Why don't you ever see that in Pakistan?"
Peter Warren Singer, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution, noted that while Americans use words such as "efficient" and "costless" to describe the campaign, some Pakistanis view it as war without honor.
"The civilian-casualties narrative is a misnomer; it's not a driver of perceptions," said Singer, the author of "Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century." He said that in the tribal areas, the technology itself can be seen as evil because it is so alien.
The fear of collateral damage has led to what officials describe as a rigorous process for confirming the identity of terrorism suspects -- a process that includes what one U.S. official described as "advance visual observation" by operatives or surveillance drones. But new tools and weapons are equally important, the officials said.
"We're talking about precision unsurpassed in the history of warfare," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the CIA program is highly classified.
Today, several small missiles are available to the agency, including the 21-inch Small Smart Weapon, created by Lockheed Martin. Weighing 35 pounds and having roughly the diameter of a coffee cup, the Scorpion, as it is now called, was designed to be launched from the Predator. It causes far less destruction than a Hellfire, and it can be fitted with four different guidance systems that allow it to home in on targets as small as a single person, in complete darkness, according to U.S. officials familiar with the missile.
A Lockheed spokesman declined to say whether the CIA is currently using the Scorpion, which, according to a Lockheed brochure, is intended for "precision attack using a small, lethal warhead against targets in areas requiring low collateral damage." The agency is also using a variety of warheads for the Hellfire, one former senior intelligence official said. Among them is a small thermobaric warhead, which detonates a cocktail of explosive powders on impact to create a pressure wave that kills humans but leaves structures relatively intact. The wave reaches around corners and can penetrate the inner recesses of bunkers and caves, according to weapons experts.
The CIA's expanded arsenal also includes surveillance drones that carry no weapons, two former intelligence officials said. These "micro-UAVs" -- unmanned aerial vehicles -- can be roughly the size of a pizza platter and are capable of monitoring potential targets at close range, for hours or days at a stretch. At night, they can be nearly impossible to detect, said one former official who has worked with such aircraft.
"It can be outside your window and you won't hear a whisper," the official said.
Correspondent Griff Witte and staff writer Karen DeYoung in Islamabad and staff researcher Julie Tate in Washington contributed to this report.
By KEITH JOHNSON
WASHINGTON—The Obama administration, facing questions about the legality of its drone program—a key part of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan's Afghan-border region—is pushing back with a legal defense of a program it only tacitly acknowledges.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Executions and some legal scholars have questioned whether it is legal for the U.S. to target and execute individuals in countries the U.S. isn't at war with. Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell of the University of Notre Dame law school has called the drone program "unlawful killing," and says it violates international law.
For the first time, a senior Obama administration official—Harold Koh, the State Department's legal adviser—has publicly articulated the legal basis for targeted killings.
"In this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks," Mr. Koh told an audience of international legal scholars on March 25.
The Central Intelligence Agency has used drones to kill between 400 and 500 suspected militants since January 2009, senior intelligence officials say. The entire program has been expanded notably since Mr. Obama took office. While critics of the program cite collateral civilian deaths, intelligence officials say only about 20 civilians have been killed in that period—a lower estimate than that made by some independent researchers.
National security hawks in the legal community as well as among former Obama and Bush administration officials say they worry the legal scrum could limit the government's ability to track down and kill suspects. The arguments against the program echo the legal challenges that helped overturn U.S. policies on the treatment of terrorism detainees.
Mr. Koh's defense in March won agreement from national security experts such as Ken Anderson, of the Washington College of Law at American University in Washington, who has urged the administration to make a legal case to safeguard what has become an important part of the antiterrorism arsenal.
Mr. Koh's speech was also noteworthy because, before joining the State Department, Mr. Koh, a human-rights lawyer, was an outspoken critic of most of the George W. Bush administration's policies regarding the war on terrorism.Legal criticism of the drone program has continued, however. "A number of controversial questions were left unanswered" by Mr. Koh's speech, says Jonathan Manes, a lawyer on the American Civil Liberties Union's National Security Project. "The speech did not say where the government draws the line between legitimate targets—combatants and those taking part in hostitilities—and civilians, who cannot be targeted. The speech also did not set out any rules on where drones strikes can be used to target and kill individuals," Mr. Manes says.
The ACLU filed a Freedom of Information suit last month in a bid to force the government to divulge details of the classified program.
Brett McGurk, a former National Security Council official in the Bush and Obama administrations currently at the Council on Foreign Relations, says Mr. Koh sidestepped some of the "thorniest issues" surrounding targeted killing. Mr. McGurk specifically noted questions about "the implications of civilian agencies—the CIA—controlling the kill chain."
The drone program falls into a legal grey area. International Humanitarian Law regulates continuous armed conflict between states, with recognizable combatants—little of which prevails in the U.S. fight against al Qaeda and its allies.
As a civilian agency and a noncombatant under International Humanitarian Law, the CIA isn't governed by the same laws of war that cover U.S. military personnel. The CIA says the program is legal. "Without confirming any specific activity, CIA's counterterrorism operations are lawful and precise," said CIA spokeswoman Marie Harf.
A concern voiced by legal scholars and former and current administration officials is that without an articulated legal basis for the attacks, U.S. officials could in the future be targeted themselves—by crusading judges in other countries who see targeted killings as violations of humanitarian law.
Another potential pitfall: The Obama administration relies on a Bush-era congressional resolution as its main authority to track and kill suspected al Qaeda members. That 2001 resolution authorized the president to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons" deemed linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks—a justification that dims as time passes.
Relying on that authorization has its limits, warns Mr. Anderson, the American University professor as the fight widens to include individuals who aren't necessarily part of al Qaeda or armed fighters. That roster could include Anwar al Awlaki, a U.S.-born Muslim cleric believed to be hiding in Yemen, where the U.S. has aided counterterrorism efforts.
"One of these days, a future president will face new threats that don't have anything to do" with al Qaeda or the Taliban—and the 2001 congressional authorization won't serve as a legal basis for targeting those threats, Mr. Anderson says.